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The aim of this paper is to reassess the place of labour law in the wider area of 
employment  relations  research  and  to  argue  the  case  for  labour  law’s 
importance to social scientists.  We give an analytical account of the principal 
institutional  features  of  labour  law  as  a  form  of  legal  regulation,  from  an 
interdisciplinary  perspective  which  takes  into  account  both  the  internal 
workings of the labour law system and the social and economic context within 
which it has evolved.  We analyze, in the manner of an internal or ‘immanent’ 
critique, the categories which are generally used within labour law discourse to 
describe the social and economic relations of employment; account for their 
emergence  and  evolution  in  historical  terms;  consider  the  origins  of  their 
diversity  across  different  national  systems;  and  look  at  future  prospects  for 
convergence or divergence.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The field of labour law grew up alongside that of industrial relations and has 
generally been closely aligned with it.  Industrial or ‘employment relations’ 
research has played a major, perhaps even predominant influence, in shaping 
labour law scholarship.  In the first half of the twentieth century, legal scholars 
and  practising  lawyers  in  Europe  and  north  America  looked  to  industrial 
sociology  to  provide  them  with  concepts  and  data  which  could  be  used  to 
challenge  the  pre-existing  legal  order,  which  they  saw  as  restrictive  and 
outdated.  This is the approach associated, most notably, with ‘legal realism’ in 
the  United  States  and  the  work  of  the  ‘social  jurists’  in  Weimar  Germany.  
Labour law continues to reflect these origins and, as a legal sub-discipline, is 
uniquely open to the influence of the social sciences.  Today labour lawyers are 
taking on the task of engaging not just with the broad sociological tradition as it 
relates to employment relations, but with political science, gender theory, social 
psychology and, above all, economics.  Social scientists, in turn, are devoting 
increased  resources  to  exploring  the  impact  of  legal  and  related  regulatory 
changes  on  the  issues  which  concern  them,  which  include  organizational 
performance,  labour  market  outcomes  in  terms  of  indicators  such  as 
unemployment, poverty and inequality, national economic competitiveness, and 
cross-national diversity.   
 
To  speak  of  alignment  or  engagement  between  labour  law  and  the  social 
sciences  is  not  to  assume  that  the  process  is  without  difficulties.    In  the 
immediate  post-war  years,  ‘industrial  pluralism’  provided  a  theoretical 
framework that united the various aspects of what in the Anglophone world 
became known as ‘industrial relations’.  Labour law was part of that field, its 
place acknowledged, for example, by Kahn-Freund’s chapter in the first (1954) 
edition  of The  System  of  Industrial  Relations  in  Britain, which  was  entitled 
‘Legal framework’.  This contained the influential observation that ‘there is, 
perhaps,  no  major  country  in the  world  in  which  the  law  has  played  a  less 
significant  role  in  the  shaping  of  [collective  labour  relations]  than  in  Great 
Britain’ (Kahn-Freund, 1954: 47).  Kahn-Freund’s belief in the peripheral role 
of law was not, however, confined to his analysis of the British case; in his 1972 
Hamlyn lectures, Labour and the Law, in the context of a broad comparative 
synthesis, he continued to insist that  law was a ‘secondary force in human 
affairs, and especially in labour relations’ (Kahn-Freund, 1977: 2).  This can be 
read, at one level, as a methodological point: a reminder that there are limits to 
how  far  the  law  can  be  used  in  an  instrumental  way  to  shape  social  and 
economic outcomes.  But it was also, implicitly, a reaffirmation of a particular 
version  of  the  pluralist  position,  namely  the  idea  that  industrial  relations 
systems rested on an autonomous or ‘extra-legal’ arrangement of social forces.    2 
The law, and the state more generally, could support that arrangement of forces 
in various ways, as it did when it intervened to maintain or extend collective 
bargaining (‘auxiliary’ legislation), or to set wages and terms of employment in 
areas of the economy where collective agreements were weak or non-existent 
(‘regulatory’ legislation), but it could not fundamentally alter it.  
 
That view, as we now know, did not long survive the ending of the policy 
consensus  around  support  for  collective  bargaining  which  occurred  in  most 
systems, in varying forms, in the course of the 1980s and 1990s.  Yet labour law 
has ‘fragmented’ as a field  not simply because the state no longer supports 
collective  bargaining  as  the  principal  or  preferred  mechanism  for  regulating 
employment to the same degree that it did, but also because many additional 
interests to those of ‘subordinated’ or dependent labour are taken into account 
in the framing of labour legislation (Collins, 1997).  The expansion of anti-
discrimination  legislation  and  the  related  orientation  of  labour  law  towards 
human  rights  discourses  offer  one  illustration  (Fredman,  1997);  another  is 
provided  by  attempts  to  use  law  as  a  mechanism  for  ensuring  economic 
‘competitiveness’  (Collins,  2001,  2002,  2003),  raising  employment  levels 
(Ashiagbor, 2005) and bringing about a ‘more flexible labour market’ (Davies 
and Freedland, 2007).  Labour law, understood as a set of regulatory techniques, 
is having to accommodate a greater range of objectives, at the same time that its 
use  as  an  instrument  of  social  and  economic  policy  is  contradicting  the 
‘pluralist’  methodological  precepts  around  which  many  of  those  techniques 
were initially developed.   
 
Under these circumstances it is no surprise that labour lawyers regularly talk 
about  the  ‘crisis’  of  their  discipline  and  seek  to  develop  new  conceptual 
frameworks  for  use  in  legal  discourse.    One  option,  increasingly  gaining 
ground, is to widen the scope of the subject so that it in effect becomes ‘the law 
of the labour market’, encompassing the variety of mechanisms currently being 
used, in a legal context, to regulate labour supply and demand.  At one level this 
involves greater attention being paid to the links between labour law and other 
fields  of  regulation such  as  social  security  law,  company  law,  taxation,  and 
active labour market policy.  More fundamentally, those who take this view 
argue that ‘a broader focus on “labour market regulation” has a stronger chance 
of  holding  the  subject  together  than  the  existing  framework’  (Arup  and 
Mitchell, 2006: 16).  This is not just about redrawing boundaries, but moving 
away from ‘a traditional labour law subject [which] is still largely organized 
around  legal  categories  (the  contract  of  employment,  the  law  pertaining  to 
bargaining  and  conciliation  and  arbitration,  the  law  on  trade  unions  and 
industrial action, health and safety law and so on), and applies mainly to legal 
reasoning and to generally legal materials’, to one in which ‘our inquiry will   3 
inevitably be directed to key issues in regulatory scholarship – the constitutive 
role of regulation, types of regulatory norms, regulatory techniques, regulatory 
institutions,  and  their  effectiveness,  responsiveness  and  coherence’.    This 
necessitates a greater recognition of ‘the importance of interdisciplinary studies 
in understanding the need for particular legal modifications in labour markets, 
and understanding the evolution of labour law’ (Arup and Mitchell, 2006: 17-
18). 
 
In one sense this simply takes us back to the origins of labour law which was, 
after all, founded in a similar spirit of interdisciplinary openness (Finkin, 2006).  
However, opening up legal discourse and analysis to outside influence was only 
part  of  the  process  which  took  place  in  the  first  decades  of  the  twentieth 
century; the refashioning of legal concepts in the light of what were then seen as 
new social policy goals was also important, and this, paradoxically perhaps, 
focused attention back on to those very doctrinal structures which formed the 
core  of  ‘formalist’  legal  analysis.    Kahn-Freund  famously  enjoined  labour 
lawyers to follow the example of Sinzheimer in going ‘through’ not ‘round’ the 
law,  by  which  he  meant  that  legal  studies  should  not  seek  to  abandon 
conceptual exposition as one of its core tasks (Kahn-Freund: 1981: 77).  It is 
indeed difficult to see how labour law could survive as a discrete field if this 
were not one of its central objectives; and it is therefore appropriate that the 
conceptual  reformulation  of  labour  law’s  basic  categories,  including  the 
employment contract or relationship, is currently the focus of a considerable 
body of work (Freedland, 2003; Collins et al. (eds.), 2007).  For sociologists, 
economists  and  others  who  are  concerned  with  the  social  operation  or 
functioning of legal rules and institutions, the internal structure of labour law 
might seem to be less of a pressing issue.  Yet, a unified approach to the subject 
would  recognize  that  labour  law  is  not  simply  a  cipher  for  wider  social  or 
economic  forces,  but  an  autonomous  institutional  phenomenon,  which 
influences the way in which policy is translated into formal legislation, and the 
way in which rules operate in practice.  To that extent, many of the internal 
workings of the labour law system – not simply the institutional processes by 
which disputes are resolved, but the forms of legislation and the conceptual 
categories which are used by lawyers to frame their own discourse – are, in 
principle,  of  importance  to  social  scientists  seeking  to  understand  the 
implications of legal regulation for their own areas of inquiry. 
 
In the context of a collection of papers designed to provide an overview of 
research in the employment relations field, our aim, as labour lawyers, is to 
reassess the place of labour law in that wider area of study and to argue the case 
for labour law’s importance to social scientists.  We will not attempt to review 
the  vast  empirical  literature,  mostly  consisting  of  work  by  social  scientists,   4 
which examines aspects of the operation of legal rules in practice.  This is, 
indeed a huge field.  The study of the way legal rules work in practice has a 
very long tradition in industrial relations scholarship, which, if we just consider 
the  British  context,  can  be  traced  right  back  to  the  pioneering  work  of  the 
Webbs  and  their  contemporaries  on  the  poor  law  (Webb  and  Webb,  1910; 
1927a; 1927b), factory legislation (Hutchins and Harrison, 1911), and the first 
minimum wage laws (Tawney, 1914; 1915).  After a mid-century lull during the 
period of collective laissez-faire, increasing statutory intervention in the labour 
market in the 1970s led to seminal analyses of the operation of the Industrial 
Relations Act 1971 (Weekes et al., 1971) and the unfair dismissal legislation of 
the 1970s (Dickens et al., 1985), as well as a series of studies carried out under 
the  auspices  of  the  (then)  Social  Science  Research  Council’s  program  on 
‘monitoring labour legislation’ (see Hepple and Brown, 1981).  In the course of 
the  1990s  and  2000s  this  type  of  work,  in  many  cases  sponsored  by  the 
Department of Employment and the Department of Trade and Industry, became 
both  more  quantitative  and  more  explicitly  policy-orientated,  and  it  is  now 
normal practice for Parliamentary legislation to be accompanied by regulatory 
impact  assessments  of  considerable  detail  and  sophistication.    A  survey  of 
empirical work concerning the operation of labour laws since 1997, carried out 
in 2005, provided an overview of the findings of a large number of academic 
papers on subjects ranging from working time regulation, the national minimum 
wage, trade union recognition, European works councils, non-standard work, 
and work-life balance legislation.  But this study also found that ‘there is a 
relatively  limited  amount  of  interdisciplinary/multi-disciplinary  research 
bringing together academic lawyers and those trained in social science’.  This 
was  because,  on  the  one  hand,  ‘labour  law  research  and  writing  has  been 
constrained  by  traditional  methods’,  while,  on  the  other,  industrial  relations 
scholars ‘still investigate labour markets and workplace relations focusing on 
areas where legal regulation is intended, or could be expected, to play a role (for 
example,  employers’  labour  use  strategies;  worker  representation)  without 
actively exploring or commenting on this aspect’ (Dickens and Hall, 2005: 32).   
 
Against this background, our objective is to give an analytical account of the 
principal institutional features of labour law as a form of legal regulation, from 
an  interdisciplinary  perspective  which  takes  into  account  both  the  internal 
workings of the labour law system and the social and economic context within 
which it has evolved.  To that end we will seek to analyze, in the manner of an 
internal  or  ‘immanent’  critique  (Supiot,  1994),  the  categories  which  are 
generally used within labour law discourse to describe the social and economic 
relations  of  employment;  to  account  for  their  emergence  and  evolution  in 
historical  terms;  to  consider  the  origins  of  their  diversity  across  different   5 
national  systems;  and  to  consider  future  prospects  for  convergence  or 
divergence.   
 
We begin by tracing the historical emergence of the contract of employment as 
the basic building block of labour law in different jurisdictions.  We then look at 
current  developments  in  relation  to  the  individual  employment  relationship, 
before turning to a consideration of collective labour relations.  This approach is 
justified by the continuing relevance of some of the core concepts, and by the 
need to consider just how far they are changing as a consequence of external 
pressures,  and  why.    We  conclude  by  offering  some  observations  on  the 
prospects  for  labour  law  in  a  period  of  organizational  and  institutional 
transition. 
 
2. Origins of the modern labour market: the evolution of the contract of 
employment 
 
One way in which labour law maintains its boundaries with other subjects is 
captured  by  the  proposition  that  labour  law  is  principally  concerned  with 
relationships of so-called ‘dependent’ or ‘subordinated’ labour, that is, relations 
between  employers  and  employees.    The  concept  of  ‘subordination’  is  most 
explicit  in  civil  law  systems  but  is  present  in  the  common  law  too  under 
different terminology (such as the ‘control’, ‘integration’ and ‘economic reality’ 
tests used to denote employee status).  This concept defines the legitimate scope 
of managerial prerogative – the employer’s right to give orders and to require 
loyalty of the employee – while also providing protection to employees against 
certain  risks.    These  include  physical  risks  (the  domain  of  early  factory 
legislation and now of occupational safety and health) and economic risks (such 
as interruptions to earnings and employment from sickness, unjust dismissal, 
termination on economic grounds, or old age).  The genuinely self-employed are 
excluded from this type of regulation, on the grounds that they enjoy autonomy 
over the form and pace of work and over arrangements for their own economic 
security.  In this way, labour law is closely aligned with social security law and 
tax law, which share with it many of the same risk-shifting functions.   
 
The focus on the relationship of employment seems self-evident as the basis for 
labour  law,  but  it  is  in  fact  both  a  controversial  idea  and  an  historically 
contingent  concept.  The  twin  ideas  that  work  relations  under  capitalism  are 
‘contractual’, and that they can be captured using the term ‘employment’, are 
more recent than is often supposed.  There is evidence that in the first phases of 
industrialization  in  Europe  and  America,  labour  was  not  uniformly  or  even 
generally ‘free’ and that contractual concepts played a limited role in defining 
the parties’ mutual obligations.  The employment model, as we have since come   6 
to know it, was initially confined to a small segment of the wage- or salary-
dependent  labour  force.    The  manner  of  the  emergence  of  the  ‘contract  of 
employment’  to  occupy  a  central  place  in  modern  labour  law  systems  is  of 
interest  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  relationship  between  law  and 
industrialization, and from the perspective of comparative legal development 
under capitalism. 
 
2.1 The common law: Britain and America 
 
The institutional roots of a market economy in Britain can be found in the later 
middle  ages  and  in  the  early  modern  period;  the  stimulus  provided  to 
innovations in governance by such events as the Black Death (Palmer, 1993) 
and  the  dissolution  of  the  monasteries  have  been  extensively  documented 
(Woodward, 1980).   England already had a mature national legal system at this 
stage,  the  significance  of  which  for  its  economic  development  is  only  now 
beginning to be understood.  However, wage labour in the modern sense of that 
term  did  not  exist  at  this  point.    The  terms  used  by  the  pivotal  Statute  of 
Artificers of 1562 and the poor law legislation of this period, including ‘servant’ 
and ‘labourer’, have to be treated with care; it would be a mistake to see them as 
simply the functional equivalents of the much later concept of the ‘contract of 
employment’ (Deakin and Wilkinson, 2005: ch. 2).   
 
The century after 1750 which is conventionally associated with the period of the 
‘industrial  revolution’  in  Britain  was,  in  addition  to  being  a  time  of  rapid 
technological  and  social  change,  also  a  period  of  legal  innovation;  hence 
Toynbee’s  suggestion,  made  in  the  1860s,  that  the  essence  of  the  industrial 
revolution was not to be found in the adoption of steam power or the advent of 
factory  labour,  but  in  ‘the  substitution  of  competition  for  the  medieval 
regulations which had previously controlled the production and distribution of 
wealth’ (Toynbee, [1864] 1969: 92).  Competition in the labour market was 
promoted  through  the  repeal  of  the  wage-fixing  laws  and  apprenticeship 
regulations which had contained in the Statute of Artificers (in 1813 and 1814 
respectively).    It  might  be  thought  that  this  would  have  led  to  the 
contractualization of labour relations and hence to the recognition in the courts of 
the concept of the contract of employment as the paradigm legal form of the work 
relationship.  However, this is not what happened.  For some occupational groups, 
a type of employment contract did indeed emerge, to which the courts attached 
status obligations in the form of implied contractual terms.  The common law 
action for wages due as earned under the contract, and the action for damages for 
wrongful  dismissal,  can  be  identified  in  cases  from  the  early  decades  of  the 
nineteenth  century  (Freedland,  1976).    However,  these  decisions  were  almost 
without  exception  based  on  the  employment  of  managerial,  clerical  or   7 
professional workers.  Manual workers fell under the distinctive legal regime of 
the Master and Servant Acts, under which breach of the service contract was a 
criminal offence, for which thousands of workers were fined or imprisoned each 
year up to the 1870s (Deakin and Wilkinson, 2005: 61-74).   
 
The master-servant model was not a hold-over from the corporative regime of the 
Statute of Artificers and old poor law.  On the contrary, most of the disciplinary 
powers used by employers and courts were additions from the mid eighteenth 
century and early nineteenth century, the result of parliamentary action to bolster 
the prerogatives of the new employer class.  The nature of the paradigm legal 
form of the labour relationship under early industrial capitalism in England was 
statutory and hierarchical, rather than common law and contractual.  The legal 
influence of the master-servant regime was just as far reaching as its considerable 
social and economic impact.  The model of a command relation, with an open-
ended  duty  of  obedience  imposed  on  the  worker,  and  reserving  far-reaching 
disciplinary powers to the employer, spilled over into the common law, so that 
long after the repeal of the last of the Master and Servant Acts in 1875, not just the 
terminology  of  master  and  servant  but  also  many  of  the  old  assumptions  of 
unmediated control were still being applied by the courts as they developed the 
common law of employment (Hay and Craven, 2004). 
 
US  employment  law  took  a  divergent  path  at  this  point,  but  one  which  also 
resulted in the emergence of a general model for the employment relationship 
based on contract. By the early twentieth century almost all states had adopted an 
‘employment  at  will’  rule,  under  which  the  contract  of  employment  could  be 
terminated by either party on a moment’s notice, without giving a reason.  This 
conferred  almost  no  job  security  upon  the  employee.    Where  the  British  and 
American systems diverged in the final decades of the nineteenth century was 
over the question of whether all employment relationships should be presumed to 
be at will unless the contrary were stated.  The American courts, following Payne 
v.  Western  &  Atlantic  Railroad
1  and  in  particular  Martin  v.  New  York  Life 
Insurance Co.
2 which concerned a middle class employee, began to apply just 
such a general presumption.  The extension of the at-will model was primarily a 
product of a constitutional debate over the legitimacy of social legislation. The 
question  of  the  construction  of  the  terms  of  employment  contracts  took  on  a 
general significance, far beyond the immediate question of rights under the wage-
work  bargain  between  employer  and  employee  (Njoya,  2007).    No  such 
presumption developed in Britain, principally because there was no equivalent to 
the constitutional dimension to the issue which arose in the United States.  
 
In  Britain,  the  advent  of  the  welfare  state  and  the  extension  of  collective 
bargaining,  neither  of  which  was  subject  to  constitutional  constraints,  saw   8 
employment law taking a different path (see Deakin and Wilkinson, 2005: 86-
100).  However, the persistence of the master-servant model, and the enduring 
influence of the principle of less eligibility in the long transition from the poor law 
to social security, which was completed only in the 1940s, delayed the advent of 
the modern ‘contract of employment’; if that idea is identified, above all, with a 
classification of labour relations which incorporates the ‘binary divide’ between 
employees and the self-employed, we have to look to the middle of the twentieth 
century to find it in British labour law.  The first statutes to adopt the binary divide 
in a clear form were concerned with income taxation and social insurance.  The 
National  Insurance  Act  1946,  which  incorporated  Beveridge’s  plan  for  social 
security,  marked  the  turning  point;  its  clear  division  between  those  employed 
under a ‘contract of service’, a term which gradually became interchangeable with 
the  term  ‘contract  of  employment’,  and  those  who  were  ‘self-employed’  or 
independent contractors, was then carried over into early employment protection 
statutes in the 1960s.  The term ‘contract of employment’ is a recent innovation in 
British labour law, just as it is in civil law jurisdictions. 
 
2.2 The civil law: French and German models 
 
There is evidence from the civil law systems to support the suggestion that the 
modern contract of employment is an invention of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, associated with the rise of the integrated enterprise and the 
beginnings of the welfare or social state.  The emerging forms of wage labour 
were grafted on to the traditional Roman law concept of the locatio conductio in 
the  post-revolutionary  codes  of  the  early  1800s.    The  adoption  of  contractual 
forms and language was more explicit than in the British case at this time.   In 
adapting the model of the locatio, the drafters of the codes were grouping labour 
relationships  with  other  types  of  contracts,  the  effect  being  to  stress  that,  in 
common with them, they were based on exchange (Veneziani, 1986: 32).  Labour, 
or  in  some  versions  labour  power  –  as,  for  example,  in  the  German  term 
Arbeitskraft  –  thereby  became  a  commodity  which  was  linked  to  price  (not 
necessarily  the  ‘wage’),  through  the  contract.    The  notion  of  the  personal 
‘subordination’ of the worker was absent from the formulae used by the codes 
(Simitis, 2000).  The reality was rather different, since more or less all systems 
acknowledged the power of the employer to give orders, to issue rules which had 
binding force (in the form, for example, of the French livret or work book), and to 
retain the worker in employment, without a testimonial, until they considered the 
work to be complete.  However, this body of legislation and practice was formally 
separated from the general private law of the codes, and administered by police 
authorities  and  specialized  labour  tribunals;  as  a  result,  it  remained  under-
developed from a conceptual point of view.    
   9 
 
 
The term contract of employment or, in France, contrat de travail, only entered 
general usage in the 1880s.  The main impetus for its adoption was an argument 
by employers in larger enterprises that the general duty of obedience should be 
read into all industrial hirings.  However, once the term became established, it was 
used in turn of the century legislation on industrial accidents (Veneziani, 1986: 
64), and its adoption was promoted and systematized by commissions of jurists 
charged with developing a conceptual framework for collective bargaining and 
worker  protection  (ibid.:  68).    At  the  core  of  the  concept  was  a  notion  of 
‘subordination’  in  which  the  open-ended  duty  of  obedience  was  traded  off  in 
return for the acceptance and absorption by the enterprise of a range of social risks 
(see Cottereau, 2000, 2002; Petit and Sauze, 2006).  In Germany, a similar process 
of evolution can be traced, through which adaptations of the locatio model in the 
codes of the nineteenth century, culminating in the German Civil Code of 1896 
(on which, see Sims, 2002), were in their turn modified to produce the modern 
employment  relationship  or  Arbeitsverhältnis  in  the  legislation  of  the  Weimar 
period, with the advent of legal recognition for collective bargaining and social 
legislation. 
 
Both  France  and  Germany,  then,  experienced  the  late  development  of  the 
contract of employment.  What emerged, however, were forms which reflected 
the  distinctive  legal  cultures  of  the  two  systems  (Mückenberger  and  Supiot, 
2000).    In  the  French-origin  systems,  the  power  of  the  state  to  regulate 
conditions of work was instantiated within the legal system through the concept 
of  ordre  public  social,  that  is,  a  set  of  minimum,  binding conditions  which 
applied as a matter of general law to the employment relationship.  The implicit 
logic of this idea was that in recognizing the formal contractual equality of the 
parties  to  the  employment  relationship,  the  state  also  assumed,  by  way  of 
symmetry,  a  responsibility  for  establishing  a  form  of  protection  for  the 
individual  worker  who  was  thereby  placed  in  a  position  of  ‘juridical 
subordination’.  In German-influenced systems, by contrast, a ‘communitarian’ 
conception of the enterprise qualified the role of the individual contract.  In 
contrast to the French approach, German law came to recognize the ‘personal 
subordination’ of the worker in the form of ‘factual adhesion to the enterprise’ 
(Tatbestand), a process which conferred ‘a status equivalent to membership of a 
community’ (Supiot, 1994: 18).   
   10 
3. The contract of employment today: conceptual evolution and change 
 
Although the emergence of a coherent model of the contract of employment 
was a considerable achievement, and a progressive one, for its time, its legacy 
has been problematic.  We will consider two main challenges currently facing 
the  law  in  its  attempt  to  regulate  individual  aspects  of  the  employment 
relationship.  First we look at why the heavy reliance on the notion of ‘contract’ 
poses  difficulties  in  regulating  the  termination  of  employment.  We  note  the 
special case of the employment relationship in the large, publicly held company. 
Second,  we  consider  the  question  of  balancing  job  security  with  flexibility, 
profitability  and  competitiveness,  a  key  issue  in  determining  the  scope  of 
employment  protection  legislation.  Economic  dismissals  remain  largely 
unregulated by law in the UK, on the basis that such regulation would impose 
rigidity and exacerbate unemployment. We consider the social implications of 
this approach, contrasting it with some of the approaches in continental Europe 
and the United States, and suggest that redefining the conceptual basis of the 
employment  relationship  may  provide  a  means  of  ensuring  a  better  balance 
between job security and economic flexibility. 
 
3.1 Shifts in the contractual foundations of the employment relationship 
 
One of the principal regulatory difficulties currently facing labour law is that of 
identifying the concepts best suited to defining and describing the employment 
relationship at a time when organizational form is in flux. As the organization 
and  social  context  of  work  change,  so  does  the  nature  of  the  employment 
relationship,  and  the  law  constantly  faces  the  challenge  of  adapting  its  own 
conceptual framework in response to these changes. As we have seen, the law 
generally  conceives  of  the  employment  relationship  as  a  contract  between 
employer and employee. This is coupled with the notion of freedom of contract 
(based on the assumptions of perfect rationality, foresight, and information on 
the part of both employer and employee) as well as the assumption that both 
parties  have  equal  bargaining  power.  These  assumptions  are  particularly 
influential in the context of individual aspects of labour law – it is usually only 
in the context of collective action that these assumptions can be more directly 
addressed, and mitigated. In terms of the individual employment relationship 
one of the most pressing concerns is that of job security. In theory freedom of 
contract allows both parties to agree on terms that grant employment security to 
the worker, but in practice inequality of bargaining power and the prevalence of 
‘standard form’ contracts mean that most workers are not in a position to enter 
into an independent negotiation of the terms and conditions of employment. 
Moreover, many atypical workers and semi-dependent workers are left outside 
the framework of the ‘contract of employment’ altogether. They do not fall   11 
within the strict legal definition of ‘employee’, and so are often not covered by 
employment protection laws.  
 
As have seen, the conceptual framework of labour law is shaped both by private 
law concepts, principally that of contract, and by social legislation. In relation to 
job security, the common law action for ‘wrongful dismissal’ is an action for 
breach of contract. ‘Wrongful’ at common law refers simply to the failure to 
give reasonable notice of dismissal, and does not include any general notion of 
unfairness.  The  traditional  rule  in  common  law  jurisdictions  was  that  the 
employer would be within its rights in terminating the contract for any reason or 
none at all, subject to giving the requisite notice or paying a monetary sum to 
the employee in lieu of notice. The only exception would be where the terms of 
the contract specify that there will be no dismissal except for just, or specified, 
causes.  
 
Yet,  the  common  law  is  not  static.    In  the  US,  there  have  been  recent 
suggestions  that  the  common  law  might  develop  to  allow  breaches  of 
contractual terms other than the notice term to give rise to a wrongful dismissal 
claim,  overcoming  or  at  least  qualifying  the  concept  of  employment  at  will 
(Stone, 2007). In the UK, the implied term of ‘mutual trust and confidence’, 
under which the employer has an obligation to deal with the employee in good 
faith, has been seen as a potential way forward in developing norms preventing 
dismissal without just cause (Brodie, 1996). Similarly, in the US, most states 
have developed limited modifications or exceptions to the at-will rule on the 
basis of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  
 
At the same time,  there are  limits to  how far the common law can go.  In 
English  law,  although  the  implied  obligation  to  maintain  mutual  trust  and 
confidence  has  had  a  considerable  impact  on  the  interpretation  of  the 
employer’s duty in the course of a continuing employment relationship, so far 
this obligation has had little, if any, discernible effect on job security in terms of 
preventing dismissals. The main reason for this is that the scope of the implied 
term of mutual trust and confidence is limited, so that it applies during the 
continuing  employment  relationship  but  does  not  extend  to  the  ‘manner  of 
dismissal.’ The courts continue to draw a careful distinction between the action 
for damages for breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence as an 
ordinary  action  for  breach  of  contract,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  action  for 
wrongful dismissal on the other. Hence, as Freedland writes (2005: 361), ‘the 
view  that  wrongful  dismissal  is  wrongful,  and  remediable  in  damages,  only 
because of its prematurity, its denial of a promised period of notice or fixed 
term of employment, has been and continues to be the dominant approach of 
English common law’.   12 
3.2  Unfair dismissal legislation 
 
The  notion  of  ‘unfairness’  in  dismissal  had  to  be  introduced  by  legislative 
intervention  in  virtually  all  systems;  it  was  not  a  natural  offshoot  or 
development  of  private  law  norms  or  concepts.    Unfair  or  unjust  dismissal 
legislation originated in continental European systems in the inter-war period 
and in the decade immediately after 1945, and has since been adopted in some 
form by most systems with the exception of the United States. ILO Convention 
No.  158  defines  its  core  elements  which  include  a  requirement  that  the 
employer should normally have a valid reason for terminating the employee’s 
employment.  Only one US state (Montana) has enacted an unjust dismissal 
statute,  even  though  a  model  code  is  available  in  the  form  of  the  Model 
Employment Termination Act (1991) which was drafted under the auspices of 
the National Conference of Commissioners for Uniform State Laws.  However, 
at the federal level there is significant legislation in the area of human-rights 
dismissals;  this  includes  federal  statutes  governing  discrimination  on  the 
grounds of sex, race, age and disability.  The levels of compensation payable by 
employers to victims of discrimination often contain punitive elements, and far 
outstrip the sums which could be paid in most European jurisdictions.   
 
In  Britain,  unfair  dismissal  legislation  dates  from  1971.    Although  this 
legislation was informed by the standards laid down by the ILO, it was also 
heavily  influenced  by  a  perceived  need  to  streamline  industrial  relations 
procedures  at  plant  level  and  to  encourage  employers  to  put  in  place 
disciplinary procedures for dealing with individual disputes, one effect of which 
would be to reduce unofficial strikes over dismissals.  The subsequent evolution 
of unfair dismissal law was influenced by the growing debate over flexibility, 
although deregulatory legislation of the 1980s made only a marginal impact on 
the  main  body  of  unfair  dismissal  protection,  which  more  or  less  remained 
intact.    Over  time,  certain  aspects  of  protection  have  been  strengthened,  in 
particular  those  relating  to  the  category  of  inadmissible  reasons  or  ‘human 
rights’ dismissals (Deakin and Morris, 2005: ch. 5).   
At the outset of the debate over labour flexibility in the early 1980s, most of the 
civil law systems began from a position of having strong dismissal laws, in 
contrast to those in the common law world which were less highly developed.  
As efforts to increase flexibility in the labour market intensified, the civil law 
systems have, in varying degrees, loosened controls over managerial decision-
making, but have done so not through changes of a far-reaching nature to the 
core of dismissal law, but through limited exemptions in favour of ‘atypical’ 
forms of work.  A number of legislative initiatives throughout the 1980s and 
1990s sought to encourage the growth of part-time and fixed-term employment   13 
by  exempting  employers  from  dismissal  protection  in  these  cases  and  by 
subsidizing hirings under these contracts through other means such as the tax-
benefit system.  The balance of opinion is that these reforms may have had a 
positive but minor overall impact on employment levels (OECD, 2004); but 
they  have  also  led  to  an  increase  in  the  numbers  employed  in  flexible  or 
‘atypical’ forms of work, and hence to growing segmentation between a secure 
‘core’  and  a  less  secure  ‘periphery’  of workers.  In  reaction  to  this negative 
development, several recent EU initiatives have sought to strengthen protection 
against  inequality  and  structural  discrimination  at  work.    These  include 
measures aimed at enhancing opportunities for temporary and part-time work at 
the same time as entrenching a principle of equality of treatment between these 
forms  of  work  and  full-time,  long-term  employment,  and  recognition  at  EU 
level of a wider principle of non-discrimination in employment. 
 
3.3. Economic dismissals 
The  dismissal  of  workers  for  ‘economic’  reasons  is  one  of  the  most 
controversial areas of legal intervention into the employment relationship. The 
justification for limiting the protective role of the law in this context is that 
when employing entities undergo organizational restructuring, the sustainability 
of the enterprise must take priority over job security. Thus the law generally 
respects  the  ‘managerial  prerogative’  to  dismiss  workers  as  a  cost-cutting 
measure. This approach is reflected across international law, European law, and 
UK law. For instance the ILO acknowledges that the ‘operational requirements 
of  the  undertaking’  may  justify  termination  of  employment  (ILO 
Recommendation No 119 of 1963, Art 2(1) and Art 12). EU law, in the context 
of the Acquired Rights Directive, allows dismissal for ‘economic, technical or 
organizational reasons’ as a defense to an unfair dismissal claim. At common 
law, in the words of Lord Hoffmann, ‘employment law requires a balancing of 
the interests of employers and employees, with proper regard not only to the 
individual dignity and worth of the employees but also to the general economic 
interest’.
3 Similarly, in the United States economic dismissals are justifiable in 
the context of collective bargaining law on grounds of ‘business necessity’.
4  
The current law governing employment security therefore contains ample scope 
for flexibility, often to the detriment of job security.  
 
It may be questioned why the law governing termination of the employment 
contract offers workers virtually no protection to the individual worker when 
the dismissal is for economic reasons.  Economic dismissals during corporate 
restructuring geared towards boosting short-term share value arguably impose 
significant social costs on workers and their communities with knock-on effects   14 
for other industries and the economy as a whole. Concerns about job security in 
this context are heightened where there is no suggestion of ‘fault’ on the part of 
the workers – blame is laid instead on impersonal market forces, which may 
intensify  the  sense  of  social  displacement  felt  by  those  affected  particularly 
where  the  job  cuts  are  not  perceived  to  be  inevitable.  In  response  to  these 
concerns, the suggestion that job security should be enhanced is countered on 
the  basis  that  job  security  for  the  employed  would  allow  core  workers  to 
become entrenched in their positions, resulting in rigid labour markets in which 
certain  marginalized  groups,  the  peripheral  and  atypical  workers  referred  to 
earlier,  are  perpetually  unemployed.  A  related  argument  is  that  employment 
protection legislation may impede the creation of new jobs, as such legislation 
potentially ‘increases the costs for the employer of adjusting their workforce 
and can create a barrier to hiring’ (OECD 2006: para. 3.3). These perspectives 
suggest that job security should therefore be understood as simply extending to 
the availability of jobs in the economy as a whole, and especially widening 
access  to  employment  opportunities,  rather  than  with  job  protection  for  the 
employed  in  their  specific  or  current  positions. However,  while  the  concern 
about the entrenchment of secure core workers is legitimate, recent empirical 
studies published by the OECD ‘generally have not found robust evidence for a 
significant  direct  effect  of  [employment  protection  legislation]  on 
unemployment’ (ibid.).  The risks of adverse effects on opportunities for the 
unemployed appear to arise only when job protection is ‘too strict’, and not 
simply  from  the  mere  existence  of  job  protection.  The  OECD  therefore 
recommends  that  the  implementation  of  such  legislation  should  be  ‘quick, 
predictable  and  distort  labour  turnover  as  little  as  possible’,  and  ‘should  be 
carefully coordinated with reforms to the unemployment benefits system … so 
as to reconcile so far as is possible labour market flexibility with security for 
workers’ (ibid.). 
 
The differences in levels of job protection in different jurisdictions partly reflect 
variations in the overall economic, political and institutional context of each 
country. This context has in turn given rise to different responses to the issue of 
how  to  regulate  the  employment  relationship.  Despite  the  fact  that 
industrialization and the increasing sophistication of production methods have 
brought about a shift in the organization of work globally, labour relations and 
labour laws continue to diverge sharply in different jurisdictions and so far there 
is no reason to expect this trend to change. The UK and United States have 
among the lowest levels of employment security legislation in the world (Botero 
et al., 2004). This is largely attributable to the continuing influence of private 
law concepts, in particular freedom of contract, as already noted.  Conversely, 
in most EU member states employment protection has its origin in industrial 
traditions which, while they conceptualize employment as being founded upon a   15 
private law contract, also define it, as we have seen, as a special relationship 
regulated  by  principles  of  public  law  or  mandatory  public  regulation  (ordre 
public social), which grant workers a form of quasi-constitutional entitlement to 
remain in their jobs unless there is just cause for their dismissal. For instance in 
German law dismissal, even with notice, must be ‘socially justified’ otherwise it 
is ‘illegal’; selection of employees for redundancy ‘must take into account so 
called “social aspects” [so] that those who suffer the most from the effects of 
the dismissal should be the last ones to be dismissed … social justice for each 
individual  case’  (Weiss,  1988:  86-88,  discussing  the  Act  on  Dismissal 
Protection of 1951 (s.1)).   
 
Criticisms that the European approach to job security is too rigid have prompted 
reform proposals by the European Commission. Although the Commission still 
refers to ‘full employment’ as one of the goals of its employment agenda, this is 
now  giving  way  to  concepts  such  as  adaptability,  responsiveness,  and 
employability. Flexibility on the workers’ side is understood as the workers’ 
capacity to anticipate change and move readily from one type of job to another. 
As European employment policy emphasizes the creation of ‘more and better 
jobs’  the  focus  is  on  ensuring  that  workers  who  lose  their  jobs  will  find 
alternative opportunities within a dynamic and vibrant economy.  
 
Yet there are difficulties inherent in this focus on flexibility. For many highly 
skilled workers who have invested years of work in a particular firm or trade it 
may prove impossible to find an alternative of comparable worth, an effect 
often  felt  for  the  remainder  of  the  worker’s  career.  Where  the  worker  is 
compelled  to  take  the  next  best  alternative,  empirical  studies  demonstrate 
‘substantial and long-lasting effects of job loss on annual earnings and wages’ 
over the long term, from which many workers never recover (Topel, 1900: 181). 
This has been defined as the real cost of job loss, that is, ‘the difference between 
the utility value of being in the current job and that of the next best alternative’ 
(Green and McIntosh, 1998: 365–6). The question then becomes whether the 
overall  social  cost  of  job  loss  is  necessary  in  the  interests  of  efficiency  or 
overall wealth benefits to society. In situations where jobs are cut in order to 
boost short-term gains for the firm’s shareholders then it could be said that the 
corporation  is  ‘effectively  transferring  to  the  public  sector  the  costs  of 
maintaining these displaced workers’ (Singer, 1993: 496).   
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3.4. Alternatives to contract: the use of property-based concepts to enhance 
legal job security 
 
Several commentators have noted that there are inherent difficulties in relying 
on the concept of ‘contract’ to define the employment relationship, and that 
there is a good case to be made for moving beyond contract. In the context of 
job security in the firm the concept of property may prove more helpful than 
that of contract, in the following way. Understood as an analogy rather than as a 
‘category’ of property rights as such, the notion of property implies that the 
employee has a claim of ‘ownership’ in the form of an expectation of continued 
employment  without  fear  of  arbitrary  dispossession  (Meyers,  1964). 
Compensation for wrongful or unfair dismissal would be based not simply on 
the ‘notice period’ defined by the contract, but on the real value of the job lost. 
This  approach  is  particularly  helpful  in  understanding  the  employment 
relationship in the large firm. The dominant presumption is that the corporation 
is owned exclusively by its shareholders (who have rights of property in the 
firm) and that the workers’ interests are fully defined by and limited to the 
terms  of  their  employment  contracts.  However,  an  historical  analysis  of  the 
employment relationship reveals that property rights have not traditionally been 
associated exclusively with the rights or status of the employer.  Notions of 
respect for private property have long been invoked to support the rights of 
employees (Njoya, 2007).  
 
Recognition of the value of firm specific human capital has come to acquire 
important  implications  for  law  reform.  The  statement  in  the  European 
Commission’s Employment in Europe (2006, at 81 et seq), that ‘workers feel 
better  protected  by  a  support  system  in  case  of  unemployment  than  by 
employment protection legislation’ presents only part of the picture. It remains 
the case that job security in the job actually held is paramount: ‘a secure job is 
still  an  essential  aspect,  for  most  individuals,  of  their  long-term  economic 
security’  (Deakin  and  Morris,  2005:  569).  In  drawing  the  boundaries  of  its 
regulatory scope the law already recognizes that not all dismissals which take 
place during corporate restructuring are justifiable, and that in certain situations 
employees may have property-like claims on the firm, i.e. interests which go 
beyond the terms of their employment contracts. The best example of this in the 
UK is the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 
2006, which recognize that workers have a claim to remain in their jobs with a 
particular firm when it is sold. Such a proprietary approach is more compatible 
with an understanding of employment security as much more than ensuring that 
workers are ‘adaptable’ and ‘employable’ in different jobs. It goes further by 
understanding  employment  security  as  ‘a  form  of  regulatory  intervention 
designed to protect workers against arbitrary managerial decision-making’, a   17 
protection which recognizes the valuable long-term relationships which arise 
between employees and the firms for which they work (Deakin and Morris, 
2005: 388; Njoya, 2007).  
 
4.  Collective  labour  relations:  worker  representation  and  corporate 
governance 
 
4.1 Worker representation and the coverage of labour standards 
 
Representation of workers through independent trade unions which negotiated 
pay and conditions of employment on their behalf with an employer or groups 
of  employers  became  the  predominant  model  around  which  the  collective 
labour  law  of  the  twentieth  century  developed.    It  is  reflected  in  the  core 
principles of freedom of association of the ILO and in the practice of many 
systems.    However,  systems  differ  in  the  nature  and  extent  of  state 
encouragement  for  collective  bargaining  provided,  the  levels  at  which 
bargaining  takes  place,  and  the  mechanisms  for  determining  the 
representativeness of unions.   
 
There is a case for seeing a division of systems along the lines suggested by the 
‘variety of capitalism’ approach (Hall and Soskice, 2001).  In so-called ‘liberal 
market’ systems, the predominant form of employee representation is collective 
bargaining  between  employers  and  trade  unions.    From  a  legal  perspective, 
collective  bargaining  operates  in  manner  akin  to  setting  up  a  contractual 
mechanism  for  negotiation.    This  can  be  done  by  the  employer  voluntarily 
recognizing  a  particular  union  or  unions,  or  through  various  regulatory 
mechanisms which, as in the United States since the 1930s, have required the 
employer to negotiate with a certified bargaining agent which can demonstrate 
that it has majority support in the relevant bargaining unit.  On the face of it, the 
US system offers strong legal support for a union which can demonstrate in a 
workplace election that it has majority support in a bargaining unit.  The union 
becomes  the  certified  bargaining  agent  for  that  unit,  and  as  a  result  has  a 
statutory monopoly over bargaining for pay and conditions in respect of the 
employees in question.  However, this arrangement, put in place by the federal 
National Labour Relations (or Wagner) Act of 1935 and subsequently amended 
by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, is less favourable to unions than it might seem.  
Enforcing the employer’s duty to bargain is often problematic, and employers 
are permitted to deploy a powerful array of weapons in frustrating unionization 
drives and in pressing for decertification.  Attempts to reform the law so as to 
allow alternative forms of employee representation to emerge, and to soften the 
rigidly  adversarial  quality  of  the  certification  process,  have  failed.    The 
deficiencies of the law are thought to be a contributing factor in the decline of   18 
union density in the United States to its current level of only 7% in the private-
sector, compared to 36% in the public sector where institutional support for 
collective bargaining is stronger (Kolins Givan, 2007). 
 
In Britain, for most of the twentieth century, the ‘recognition’ of trade unions by 
employers  –  agreement  to  enter  into  collective  bargaining  over  pay  and 
conditions,  among  other  things  –  was  a  matter  of  consent  rather  than  of 
statutory imposition.    The  law  imposed  no  duty  to  bargain  and,  conversely, 
played no role in certifying unions as bargaining agents, hence Kahn-Freund’s 
insistence on seeing its role as ‘marginal’ in relation to autonomous sources of 
regulation.  The law preserved a wide freedom to strike, and to lock-out, by 
granting unions and individuals immunities from liability in tort for organizing 
strike  action.    The  absence  of  direct  legal  intervention  was  seen  to  be  the 
system’s principal strength.  However, since the 1970s, the system of collective 
bargaining  has  undergone  a  process  of  decline,  with  falling  coverage  of 
collective agreements (down to below 40% from over 80% in 1979) and falling 
union density (now below 30% from a peak of nearly 60% in 1979).  It is not 
entirely clear that the legal reforms of the 1980s, which cut back on the freedom 
to  strike  and  encouraged  decentralization  of  collective  bargaining,  were  the 
critical factor in precipitating this decline, but there is some evidence that they 
were (Freeman and Pelletier, 1990).  Since 2001 Britain also has a system of 
compulsory recognition, based superficially on aspects of the US model, but 
with  some  critical  differences,  in  particular  the  greater  role  accorded  to 
encouragement  for  voluntary  agreements  outside  the  framework  of  the 
legislation (Wood and Godard, 1999).   
 
Whatever the degree of state compulsion used to bring about recognition or 
certification, there are strict limits to how far collective bargaining can go in 
relation to the core areas of managerial ‘prerogative’, so that it stops short of co-
decision making or codetermination (for the US, see Weiler, 1990; for Britain, 
Wedderburn,  1986:  ch.  4).    Outside  those  areas  where  employers  concede 
collective bargaining or have it forced on them by public regulation, there is no 
legal obligation to deal with employee representatives.  In their emphasis on 
collective  bargaining  as  a  form  of  regulated  contractual  coordination,  these 
systems may continue to be characterized as voluntarist.    
 
Voluntarism at the level of the enterprise tends to go hand in hand with a partial 
approach to regulation at market level.  Thus although both Britain and the 
United  States  have  national  minimum  wage  laws  and  some  legislation 
governing basic terms and conditions such as working hours, the tendency has 
been  for  statutory  regulation  to  impose  only  minimal  constraints  on  the 
employment contract outside those sectors which are governed by collective   19 
bargaining.  As collective bargaining has shrunk, since the 1950s in America 
and the late 1970s in Britain, so the uneven and partial character of labour 
market regulation has been accentuated within these systems (for the United 
States, see Weiler, 1990; for the UK, see Deakin and Wilkinson, 1991). 
 
‘Coordinated  market’  systems,  on  the  other  hand,  tend  to  combine  an 
integrative  approach  to  the  role  of  employees  in  the  enterprise  with 
universalism  in  labour  market  regulation.    ‘Integration’  implies  the 
incorporation of employee voice directly into the decision-making structures of 
the  firm.    In  many  civil  law  systems,  particularly  those  located  in  Western 
Europe,  sectoral  bargaining  ensures  that  a  basic  floor  is  set  to  terms  and 
conditions of employment, with legal support.  In addition, legislation normally 
mandates some form of collective employee representation at plant or enterprise 
level.  The function of works councils (in Germany, in particular) is not (on the 
whole) to enter into collective bargaining, but rather to engage in the explicitly 
cooperative goal of ‘codetermination’ of the working process.   This involves 
representing employee voice to the employer and monitoring the application of 
laws  and  agreements  within  the  workplace,  functions  which  are  intended  to 
complement collective bargaining operating at a multi-employer level.    In 
Germany,  collective  bargaining  between  trade  unions  and  associations  of 
employers to set basic terms and conditions mostly takes place at industry or 
sector  level;  in  that  sense,  codetermination  within  the  enterprise  is 
complementary to trade union autonomy both from management interests and 
from state interference at industry level.  The effects of collective agreements 
can  be  extended  to  non-federated  employers  by  statutory  order.    In  France, 
where  enterprise  committees  and  other  representative  bodies  operate  at 
enterprise level in rather different fashion from the German works council (they 
have fewer legal powers and also have employer representation), we again find 
strong multi-employer bargaining at sectoral level.  France also has a statutory 
minimum  wage  which  is  linked  to  wage  (and  not  just  price)  increases  and 
legislation  on  working  time  and  other  aspects  of  terms  and  conditions  of 
employment which is enforced by a well-resourced labour inspectorate.  
 
4.2 Information and consultation of employee representatives 
 
A  key  element  of  the  continental  European  model  is  the  obligation  of  the 
employer  to  enter  into  processes  of  ‘information  and  consultation’  with  the 
workforce representatives.  This principle is incorporated in Article 27 of the 
European  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  and  has  now  been  embodied  in  a 
series of European Union directives.  This has the effect of institutionalizing a 
role for employee representation when decisions are taken which affect the form 
and  operation  of  the  enterprise,  such  as  large-scale  restructurings  leading  to   20 
dismissals  and  transfers  of  businesses  between  employers.    Transnational 
enterprises  are  required  to  enter  into  regular  consultation  with  employee 
representatives under the terms of the European Works Councils Directive of 
1995, a model which was extended to other companies above a certain size 
threshold by the Information and Consultation of Employees Directive of 2002 
(ICE). The ICE Directive has introduced significant changes to collective labour 
law in systems such as the UK and Ireland which had traditionally relied on a 
‘single channel’ model of collective representation in which the sole mechanism 
for consulting workers was the recognized trade union. This left non-unionized 
workers unable to benefit from rights of information and consultation granted 
by  European  law.  Moreover,  in  the  absence  of  any  general  framework  for 
consultation, even those workers who were unionized would only have such 
rights in specific situations such as redundancies and transfers of undertakings. 
For  these  reasons,  in  so  far  as  it  goes  against  the  pre-existing  tradition  of 
collective representation, the possible impact of the ICE Directive in Ireland 
and the UK is likely to  prove more controversial and problematic than in other 
member states. 
 
One of the difficulties in assessing the role of the ICE Directive within the legal 
framework  of  liberal  market  economies  is  that  strong  rights  of  employee 
consultation and representation in decision-making in the firm are perceived as 
incompatible with the notion that a company’s directors are solely accountable 
to their shareholders, not the employees, for the decisions they make. Decision-
making  is  an  essential  attribute  of  ownership  and  control.  Within  a  legal 
tradition in which ownership and control are assumed to vest exclusively in 
shareholders  (and  in  managers  as  the  shareholders’  agents),  the  general 
understanding  has  been  that  employee  decision-making  rights  should  not  be 
prescribed by legislation. As we saw above, in view of the limits on how far 
collective  bargaining  can  go  in  relation  to  the  core  areas  of  managerial 
prerogative the tradition in both the UK and the US has been to limit the scope 
of mandatory collective bargaining to wages, hours and terms and conditions of 
work.  In  contrast,  the  emerging  European  framework  of  information  and 
consultation extends to core managerial matters. For instance under Article 12 
of  the  Works  Councils  Directive  the  matters  over  which  workers  have 
information and consultation rights include the firm’s ‘structure, economic and 
financial situation, the probable development of the business and of production 
and sales … investments and substantial changes concerning organization … 
[and] transfers of production, mergers, cut-backs or closures of undertakings, 
establishments or important parts thereof.’ Critics of this approach argue that 
while it is good managerial practice to consult employees and listen to their 
ideas  and  suggestions,  any  rights  of  information  and  consultation  should  be 
limited to an opportunity for employees to express their viewpoint (understood   21 
as  rights  of  ‘voice’)  but  should  not  extend  to  a  right  to  influence  the  final 
decision. As expressed by the US Supreme Court, in introducing a ‘duty to 
bargain’  with  employee  representatives  under  the  NLRA  ‘Congress  had  no 
expectation that the elected union representative would become an equal partner 
in the running of the business enterprise in which the union’s members are 
employed’; ultimately, ‘management must be free from the constraints of the 




This perspective has nevertheless been challenged as overlooking the fact that 
in  the  modern  knowledge  and  skills  based  economy  employees  who  make 
valuable  investments  of  firm-specific  human  capital  are  just  as  entitled  to 
participate  in  decision-making  as  shareholders  who  invest  finance  capital 
(Njoya, 2007). If ownership of the firm is understood as a ‘bundle of rights’ 
which includes the right to participate in controlling the firm’s operations and 
strategy, then such ownership may be understood as shared between employees 
and shareholders. This would imply that employee participation in decision-
making goes beyond ‘voice’ rights, extending to a role in determining outcomes 
for instance by sitting on the firm’s board of directors. Employee membership 
of corporate boards is not mandated by European Union law, and is also the 
exception at national level; Germany is the most prominent system to make this 
a requirement.  However, many systems have some combination of two-tier 
board structures and employee consultation requirements. Rights of information 
and consultation which fall short of board membership may still be understood 
within the framework of ownership rights, but only where they are coupled with 
sanctions which ensure that failure to observe these rights will invalidate the 
managers’ unilateral decision. This is the case in some member states such as 
Germany  and  France,  where  a  managerial  decision  arrived  at  without  prior 
consultation  with  employee  representatives  is  generally  (subject  to  specified 
conditions) voidable or even void (Laulom, 2001).  By contrast, in the UK the 
regulations  implementing  the  ICE  Directive  impose  a  maximum  financial 
penalty  of  £75,000  for  non-compliance  with  the  consultation  requirement, 
payable not to the affected employees but to the Secretary of State.  In the 
absence  of  any  direct  remedy  available  to  workers  for  the  firm’s  failure  to 
consult them the regulations fall far short of conferring proprietary rights on 
employees.  
 
The question may be posed whether participatory rights falling short of property 
or ownership rights are sufficient to protect employees’ firm-specific human 
capital. One perspective is that ‘voice’ rights respect the dignity of workers by 
allowing their views to be heard, and if job security is understood simply as the 
need to respect the dignity and autonomy of workers whilst dismissing them   22 
(Collins, 1992) then the existing framework of information and consultation 
under the UK regulations would appear to meet this need. Another argument is 
that there is nothing to prevent employees bargaining for rights of ownership 
and control, so that there is no need for prescriptive legislation. This perspective 
accepts that employees make valuable investments in the firm but reasons that 
‘all are left to protect themselves through contract’ (Easterbrook and Fischel, 
1991: 38).  In practice, however, such bargaining is inevitably incomplete (Kim, 
1997; Stone, 2002).   
 
This  is  not  to  suggest  that  the  property-rights  model  is  necessarily  more 
effective  at  protecting  human  capital  investments  than  a  contractual  model.  
There  are  potential  governance  costs  associated  with  participatory  decision-
making.  However, controls over restructuring which impede management and 
reduce  financial  returns  also  provide  the  basis  for  long-term  cooperation 
between  management  and  labour  in  systems  reliant  on  investments  in  firm-
specific human capital.  In this context it is significant that in German debates 
about the benefits and costs of codetermination, there does not appear to be any 
conclusive view on whether the arms-length contractual model associated with 
the Anglo-American firm is superior in terms of efficiency: ‘there have been no 
undisputed  econometric  studies  on  the  (negative  or  positive)  correlation 
between  co-determination  and  company  performance’  (Baums,  2003:  185).  
Germany’s  1998  Codetermination  Commission  considered  that  empirical 
evidence pointed to efficiency gains as well as costs (Addison et al., 2004: 394).   
 
4.3 Corporate governance and its interface with labour law 
 
A further aspect of the apparent divergence between ‘liberal’ and ‘coordinated’ 
market  systems  concerns  the  interaction  of  collective  labour  law  with  the 
predominant  structures  of  corporate  ownership  and  control  (‘corporate 
governance’) in systems.  In liberal market systems, dispersed ownership and 
market  liquidity  enable  outside  investors  to  diversify  their holdings, thereby 
spreading  the  risk  of  being  subject  to  managerial  opportunism,  while  at  the 
same time using the capital market to hold management to account, via the 
mechanism  of  the  hostile  takeover  bid.    In  different  systems,  different 
institutions have evolved which facilitate these processes.  In the United States, 
a  range  of  mechanisms,  including  shareholder  litigation  and  an  intensively 
regulatory  regime  of  securities  law,  serves  to  protect  minority  shareholder 
interests (Coffee, 1999). In Britain and other common law countries such as 
Australia, the model of the takeover code, originating in the City of London, 
plays a key role, and shareholder litigation is rare.  This reflects, to a large 
degree, the collective voice exercised by institutional investors in the British 
context, which is not matched to the same degree, historically, in the US (Black   23 
and  Coffee,  1994;  Armour  and  Skeel,  2007).    Shareholder  litigation  and 
takeover codes therefore appear to be substitutes in providing a mechanism for 
protecting minority shareholders; the presence of one means that there is less 
need for the other. 
 
By contrast, in the case of ‘insider-orientated’ or ‘coordinated market’ systems, 
the concentration of ownership allows for direct monitoring and observation of 
managerial  performance,  thereby  overcoming  some  of  the  agency  problems 
which are inherent in the separation of ownership and control in outsider-based 
régimes  (although  this  need  not  imply  the  absence  of  laws  protecting 
shareholder interests, which are often quite strong in civil law countries: see 
Siems,  2005).    Concentration  or  ‘blockholding’  takes  different  forms, 
depending on context; in varying degrees, corporate cross-shareholdings, bank-
led governance and the residue of family-based control and state control can be 
observed  (see  the  contributions  in  Hopt  et  al.,  1997).    Again,  specific  legal 
institutions  have  developed  to  complement  the  presence  of  mechanisms  of 
direct control (Rogers and Streeck, 1994).  In German-influenced systems, there 
is a role for employee-nominated directors on a supervisory board as part of a 
two-tier board structure.  Employee representation within company organs is by 
no means the general rule, however.  In France, most companies have not taken 
up the option, provided in legislation, of having a dual board, and employee 
voice,  while  significant,  mostly  operates  outside  corporate  structures  (Goyer 
and Hancké, 2003).  In Japan, a highly integrative approach to the participation 
of employees in the firm almost entirely takes the form of social norms rather 
than legal prescription (Learmount, 2002: ch. 7).   
 
In  the  context  of  coordinated  market  economies,  this  more  direct  form  of 
employee  involvement  appears  to  be  complementary  to  concentrated  share 
ownership.    Employee  representatives  may  aid  investors  in  the  process  of 
monitoring  managers,  and  may  also  bring  valuable  information  on 
organizational  processes  to  bear  on  the  decision  making  process, 
notwithstanding  possible  costs  arising  from  more  extended  or  protracted 
decision-making processes (Pistor, 1999).  Employee representation may also 
provide a more broadly-based mechanism for building trust between workers 
and  investors  and  in  particular  for  encouraging  mutual  investments  in  firm-
specific  assets  (Rogers  and  Streeck,  1994).    Either  way,  institutionalized 
employee  involvement  in  the  firm  may  be  said  to  be  complementary  to 
blockholding as a particular form of corporate ownership and control. 
 
There is evidence of enterprises and sectors which go against the trend in all 
varieties of system; British and American pharmaceutical firms behave very 
much along the lines predicted for stakeholder-orientated systems (Gospel and   24 
Pendleton, 2003), as do many utilities and service providers in regulated sectors 
(see  Deakin,  Hobbs,  Konzelmann  and  Wilkinson,  2002).    Conversely,  some 
German and Japanese companies have begun to adopt shareholder value metrics 
and  the  business  strategies  associated  with  them  (Lane,  2003;  Learmount, 
2002).  Thus  legal  institutions  do  not  rigidly  dictate  firm-level  practices.  
However, the balance of evidence suggests that a good case can be made for the 
existence  of  complementarities  across  the  linked  domains  of  corporate 
governance and labour law, and for the continuing influence of these linkages at 
firm level. (Parkinson, 2003: 491). 
 
In  Germany  and  Japan,  internal  labour  markets,  constructed  around  implicit 
promises of job security and high levels of investment in firm-specific training, 
have  remained  in  place  during  the  1990s  and  early  2000s,  when  they  have 
become a rarity in the private sector in United States and Britain.  There is also 
evidence that Japanese and German companies have adjusted to the growing 
role of external investors and to increased capital market pressures in a way 
which has left intact (so far at least) the social compromises embodied in those 
systems (Jacoby, 2005; Höpner, 2005).  Thus it is far from clear that a tendency 
to convergence of either form or function is being observed (Amable, 2003).  
Even during a period when national systems are increasingly exposed to the 
effects of transnational capital flows, regulatory competition and the growing 
acceptance, among policy makers and business elites of a ‘shareholder value’ 
norm (see Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001), governance mechanisms remain 
matched  to  local  conditions  and  reflect  particular  trajectories  of  economic 
development. 
 
5. Conclusions: the prospects for labour law in a time of transition 
 
In this chapter we have sought to explain some of the structures and concepts 
which  distinguish  labour  law  as  an  autonomous  institutional  phenomenon; 
autonomous, that is from the industrial relations system, and from labour market 
relations more broadly.  The idea that labour law possesses this autonomy and 
so is not a mere appendage or expression of social and economic forces is one 
which labour law scholars increasingly look to in an attempt to give shape to 
their  discipline  (Rogowski  and  Wilthagen,  1994).    This  is  not  to  argue  that 
labour  law  can  be  studied  in  isolation  from  the  social  sciences.    Rather,  it 
represents  a  return  to  labour  law’s  methodological  roots,  and  to  a  tradition 
which sought co-existence between what we might now describe as an ‘internal’ 
(or juridical) perspective on the conceptual language of legal discourse with an 
‘external’ (or social science) understanding of labour law as impacting on, and 
being impacted by, social and economic relations.  The essence of this approach 
is that it is only by recognizing that positive legal analysis, on the one hand, and   25 
the  sociological  or  economic  analysis  of  law,  on  the  other,  are  distinct 
techniques, that they can be effectively integrated in the study of labour law; 
one should not be dissolved into the other (Kahn-Freund, 1981: 97).   
 
From this point of view, labour law can be identified with the emergence of 
conceptual  forms  for  defining  the  employment  relationship,  the  business 
enterprise and structures of worker representation.  These forms were at one and 
the same time the product of certain prior legal categories (those of contract and 
property in private law, and the rationalization of governmental power in public 
law), and the result of the influence on the law of the social and economic 
changes which accompanied the rise of industrial societies.  Divergence across 
labour law systems is in part the legacy of the common law/civil law divide, but 
it also reflects variations in the timing of industrialization, the forms of worker 
organization and the nature of industrial enterprise in different countries.  Yet, 
there is also a high degree of functional continuity across labour law systems, 
not  least  in  the  common  identification  of  ‘subordinated  labour’  within  an 
‘employment relationship’ as the focal point of labour law regulation. 
 
According to Sinzheimer (1922; cited in Kahn-Freund 1981: 101), ‘in times of 
sudden  change,  where  the  old  disappears  and  the  new  craves  recognition,  a 
purely technical insight into the existing legal order is not sufficient’.  At the 
start of the twenty-first century, labour law seems to be going through just such 
a period, when changes to organizational forms, coupled with the delocalization 
of  production,  are  undermining  familiar  conceptual  categories.    It  is  not 
surprising  therefore  that  some  scholars  identify  at  the  core  of  labour  law  a 
‘failing  paradigm’  (Hyde,  2006:  45),  which  has  to  be  corrected  by  a 
fundamental re-evaluation of core concepts.  In this chapter we have provided 
concrete examples of the way in which these concepts have constrained the 
capacity of labour law to address contemporary problems, while also pointing 
out how even such foundational notions as those of contract and property are 
being adapted to new conditions.  A methodology which seeks to understand 
how  labour  law’s  conceptual  core  came  to  be  as  it  is,  when  allied  to  the 
techniques of the social sciences in explaining the law’s wider operation and 
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